The Two Generals' Problem is a classic unsolvable problem in distributed systems that concerns reaching consensus over a lossy network. This guide will introduce the Two Generals' Problem and give an intuitive explanation for why finding a solution to the problem is impossible. It will then formalize the Two Generals' Problem and formally prove the impossibility.
The formal model and proof of the Two Generals' Problem is taken from Notes on Theory of Distributed Systems.
Imagine two generals: General Alice and General Bob. Alice's army and Bob's army are quite a distance away from one another. The only way Alice and Bob can communicate is by sending each other enveloped messages through the mail.
Between Alice's and Bob's armies is an enemy army led by General Eve. Alice and Bob need to decide whether to attack Eve's army or to retreat from Eve's army. If they both attack or both retreat, they are victorious. If only one of Alice or Bob attacks, then they are defeated.
attack | retreat | |
---|---|---|
attack | victory | defeat |
retreat | defeat | victory |
All of Alice and Bob's messages are delivered via Eve's postal service. Eve receives every message and decides whether she wants to deliver the message or burn the message. She does not, however, get to open the enveloped message.
The Two Generals' Problem is the problem of designing an algorithm for Alice and Bob that ensures they agree to attack or agree to retreat. That is, we must write an algorithm that achieves consensus.
The Two Generals' Problem seems innocuous enough, but it turns out that there does not exist an algorithm that can guarantee consensus. Before we formally prove this impossibility, let's informally explore it with an example.
Let's say Alice wants to attack. She writes "attack" on a piece of paper, wraps the message in an envelope, and sends the message off to Bob. Now, one of two things could happen:
Alice does not know which of these events occur. Since she is unsure if her message was delivered, she can't decide to attack without the risk of Bob deciding to retreat. That is, she cannot attack with the certainty of consensus.
Perhaps we can solve this uncertainty with acknowledgements. Let's say Bob receives Alice's message. Upon receiving the message, Bob responds with an acknowledging message. Again, this message could either be burned or delivered. If the message is burned, then Alice never receives her acknowledgement and cannot make a certain decision. This means that if Bob's message is lost, Bob can't make a decision without the possibility that Alice makes the opposite decision.
Perhaps we can solve this uncertainty with more acknowledgements! Bob waits for an acknowledgement of his acknowledgement from Alice. But, after sending her acknowledgement, Alice is uncertain if it was delivered. If it wasn't, then Bob would be still be uncertain what decision to make. So, Alice waits for an acknowledgement from Bob. But, after sending his acknowledgement, Bob is uncertain if it was delivered. This cycle continues indefinitely. At no point is either Alice or Bob certain what the other General will decide to do.
In order to prove the impossibilty of solving the Two Generals' Problem, we'll need to formalize the problem. We'll label Alice and Bob $A$ and $B$. Each general has a state, $q$, from some state set $Q$. Each general also has an outbox and inbox which can hold exactly one enveloped message to send or receive respectively. A configuration is the pair of Alice and Bob's states $(q_a, q_b)$.
The system can changes with two events. In a delivery event, the message in each general's outbox is potentially moved to the other general's inbox. Eve decides whether the message is delivered or burned. For the sake of simplicity, we'll assume that both generals always have an envelope in their outbox to send. If they don't have any meaningful message then they place an empty envelope in their outbox.
In a computation event, a general updates its state and places a message in its outbox based on the message in its inbox and its current state. More formally, each process has a transition function, $f: Inbox \times Q \rightarrow Q \times Outbox$, that maps an inbox message and the current state to a new state and outbox message.
An execution is a sequence of alternating configurations and rounds of events denoted $(C_0, \phi_1, C_1, \phi_2, \ldots)$. Each $C_i$ is a configuration and each $\phi_i$ is a round of events where each general performs a computation event and then a delivery event.
An execution $E_1$ is indistinguishable to another execution $E_2$ for a general $g$ if $g$ sees the same thing in both executions. For example, consider a pair of executions with a single round of events with generals $A$ and $B$: $(C_0, \phi_1, C_1)$ and $(C_0', \phi_1', C_1')$. In $\phi_1$, $A$'s enveloped message is delivered, but in $\phi_1'$, it is not. Both executions are indistinguishable to $A$ because she cannot tell if her message was delivered or not. These executions are not indistinguishable for $B$ who can tell in round three whether or not the message was delivered. Note that if $E_1$ and $E_2$ are indistinguishable for $g$, then $g$ performs the same actions in $E_1$ and $E_2$.
Now, we'll prove that there does not exist an algorithm that can solve the Two Generals' Problem.
First, let's formalize the Two Generals' Problem. Each general begins with either a 0 or 1 in its inbox. Eve gets to decide these initial values. After some number of rounds $N$, both generals must output a 0 or 1. We require two properties for our generals that must hold for all executions.
Assume for contradiction that there does exist an algorithm that satisfies these two properties. I'll play the part of Eve and construct a contradiction. I'll do so with a time machine. I'll begin with some execution $E_1$ and continuously use my time machine to construct alternate executions that are indistinguishable to the previous execution for either Alice or Bob.
First, I'll start Alice and Bob with 1's as input. I'll allow all messages to be delivered and wait all $N$ rounds. By the validity condition, we know that Alice and Bob both output 1. Call this execution $E_1$.
Next, I'll fire up my time machine and go back one round into the past. I'll keep everything the same except this time I'll burn Alice's last message to Bob. Note that I burn the message without opening the envelope and reading the message. Call this execution $E_2$. $E_1$ is indistinguishable to $E_2$ for Alice. Thus, she must perform the same action in $E_1$ and $E_2$. This means Alice must again output 1. By the agreement condition, this means that Bob must also output 1.
I'll fire up my time machine and again keep everything the same as in $E_2$, except this time I'll burn Bob's last message to Alice. Call this execution $E_3$. $E_2$ is indistinguishable to $E_3$ for Bob, so by a symmetric argument as above, Bob and Alice both output 1.
I'll continue my time machine antics until I've dropped every messages. Alice and Bob still begin with 1's as input and still output 1 after $N$ rounds. Call this execution $E_k$.
With the help of my time machine, I'll switch Alice's input from 1 to 0. This execution, $E_{k+1}$, is indistinguishable to $E_k$ for Alice, so she still outputs 1, as does Bob. Next, I'll switch Bob's input to 0. Again, this execution, $E_{k+2}$, is indistinguishable to the previous execution, $E_{k+1}$, for Bob, so both Bob and Alice output 1.
Now that both Alice and Bob begin with an input of 0, I'll use my time machine and deliver the first message of Bob's. Then I'll deliver the first message of Alice's. I'll continue this procedure until I reach round $N$ and all messages are delivered. Note that these messages may not be the same messages I previously burned.
Now, all messages are delivered and both Alice and Bob begin with 0 as input. However, Alice and Bob still output 1! This violates the validity condition and is a contradiction.